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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND STEWART, 
vs. 
Plain ti/ f and 
Respondent, 
JOHN L. SULLIVAN and 
RICHARD MONK ALLEN, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
12958 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action filed by plaintiff, respondent, 
claming that he was injured by the willful miscon-
duct of the driver of the vehicle in which he was a 
passenger and by the negligence of the defendant 
Richard Monk Allen, the driver of the vehicle which 
collfud with the vehicle in which plaintiff was a pas-
senger. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 22, 1968 at or about 4 :00 P.M. the 
plaintiff, Raymond Stewart, was riding as a car pool 
1 
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passenger in a car being driven by the defendant John 
L. Sullivan. They were proceeding South on U.S. 
Highway 91. The defendant Richard Monk Allen was 
driving a car which was proceeding on the same high-
way in the same direction. 
The Allen vehicle collided with the rear end of 
the Sullivan vehicle and the resulting collision over-
turned the Sullivan vehicle. 
The plaintiff Raymond Stewart on March 20, 
1969 brought action against John L. Sullivan, the 
driver of his vehicle alleging willful misconduct and 
against Richard Monk Allen, the driver of the other 
vehicle which collided with the rear of the vehicle in 
which the plaintiff was a passenger. 
John L. Sullivan filed a separate action against 
Richard Monk Allen for personal injuries and dam-
ages to his vehicle. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWE'R COURT 
The defendant Richard Monk Allen moved to 
consolidate the two cases for trial. Originally the mo-
tion was denied without prejudice to renew after fur-
ther discovery. The motion was made again on No-
vember 17, 1969 and was heard on November 26, 
1969. The motion was granted December 2, 1969 by 
the Honorable Merrill C. Faux. R.33. 
On the 24th day of September, 1970, the defen-
dant John L. Sullivan served written Interrogatories 
upon the plaintiff, R. 35. The plaintiff did not an-
2 
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swer the Interrogatories of the defendant and on the 
12th day of January, 1971 almost 4 months later the 
defendant John L. Sullivan moved for an Order com-
pelling answers to the Interrogatories and for a strik-
ing of the trial setting. The motion was heard on Jan-
uary 19, 1971 by the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson 
who granted the motion and ordered as follows: 
1. "'That plaintiff answer the Interrog-
attories submitted by defendant John L. Sul-
livan dated September 24, 1970 within 15 days 
of the date of service of a copy of this Order 
upon counsel for plaintiff." R. 42. 
The plaintiff did not answer the Interrogatories 
and on March 4, 1971 a motion was made by the de-
fendant John L. Sullivan to dismiss the plaintiff's 
Complaint. The defendant Richard Monk Allen made 
a similar motion. The motions were noticed for hear-
ing before the Honorabl Aldon J. Anderson on April 
2, 1971. Due to a change in scheduling, the law and 
motion calendar was transferred to the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson who granted the defendants' mo-
tions to dismiss. The Order provided the following: 
" ... And the Court having considered the 
matter and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HERBEY ORDERED that plain-
tiff Raymond Stewart's Complaint as against 
both defendant John L. Sullivan and Richard 
Monk Allen be and it is hereby dismissed." 
R. 50, 51. 
A copy of the Order of Dismissal was served 
upon plaintiff's attorney on April 2, 1971. 
3 
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On the 19th day of April, 1971, the Complaint of 
defendant John L. Sullivan against Richard Monk 
Allen in the other action was dismissed without pre-
judice pursuant to a mutual stipulation of the parties, 
R. 52, 53. 
On the 14th day of May, 1971, the attorney for 
the plaintiff was suspended from the practice of law 
in the State of Utah. 
The plaintiff obtained a new attorney and on the 
16th day of March, 1972, without notice to any of the 
parties and ex parte, the plaintirf's new attorney ob-
tained an amended Order of Dismissal which contain-
ed the fallowing language : 
"A clerical error having been made in the 
drafting of the Order of Dismissal herein in 
that said Order omitted the words '''without 
prejudice" as directed by the Court, and said 
error having come to the attention of the Court, 
NOW. THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 
60 (a) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Court on its own initiative corrects said error 
by amending the Order of Dismissal 'to read 
as follows: 
TT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that plain-
tiff Raymond Stewart's 'Complaint as against 
both defendants, John L. Sullivan and Richard 
Monk Allen, be and it is hereby dismissed with-
out prejudice." R. 55. 
Having learned of the amended Order of Dis-
missal both defendants filed their Motions to Set 
Aside the Amended Order of Dismissal together with 
4 
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A'ffidavits. The Affidavits clearly disclose that the 
Court did not, on any occasion state that the original 
Order of Dismissal was without prejudice and no 
memorandum was made that said Order of Dismissal 
was without prejudice. 
On April 7, 1972 the plaintiff filed a Motion To 
Amend Order of Dismissal on Additional Grounds, 
R. 65, supported by an Affidavit, R. 67, in which the 
plaintiff set forth in detail the procedures he had fol-
lowed with his client and the attorney for Richard 
Monk Allen concerning the settlement off er to be 
made. The Affidavit established that contact had not 
been made with the attorney for John L. Sullivan un-
til shortly before the attorney for the plaintiff had its 
original amended Order of Dismissal entered, R. 70, 
71. 
The Motions were heard upon notice and by stip-
ulation of the parties on April 13, 1972 by the Honor-
able Stewart M. Hanson who then set aside the 
amended Order of Dismissal and denied plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend Order of Dismissal on Additional 
Grounds. The Order provided as follows: 
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDG-
ED AND DECREED, that defendants' Motion 
to set aside the Amended Order of Dismissal 
is hereby granted and pl~intiff's Mot!o_n to 
Amend the Order of Dismissal on Add1t10nal 
Grounds is hereby denied. The ~ormer entry o_f 
Dismissal previously on file m this case is 
hereby reinstated." R. 97, 98. 
On April 24, 1972, the plaintiff filed a Motion 
5 
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for Further Hearing Before Ruling of the Court. R. 
88. 
The Motion was heard pursuant to notice and a 
stipulation by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
who granted plaintiff's Motion. Said Order provided 
as follows: 
" ... and the Court having reviewed all of 
the files and records and affidavits herein and 
hearing the arguments of counsel and having 
found sufficient grounds to relieve plaintiff 
from the final judgment of dismissal herein 
and being fully advised in the premises, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT 'IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
as follows: 
1. Plain tiff's Motion to Amend the Or-
der of Dismissal herein is hereby granted and 
l'T IS ORDERED that plaintiff's Complaint 
as against both defendants be and is hereby 
dismissed "without prejudice." ' 
2. The order of May 3, 1972, granting de-
fendants' Motion to Set Aside the Amended 
Order of Dismissal herein is hereby set aside." 
R. 103. 
Both defendants filed their notices of appeal 
from said Order and the matter is now before this 
Court on appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant and appellant John L. Sullivan, 
seeks a reversal of the Order entered by the District 
Court, which Order changes the original Order of 
6 
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Dismissal with prejudice to an Order of Dismissal 
without prejudice. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ORIGINALLY ENTERED 
A DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
WITH PREJUDICE. 
It is without dispute that plaintiff had not filed 
its Answers to the Interrogatories of the defendant 
even after the trial Court had entered its Order (R. 
42), that said Interrogatories be answered. 
A subsequent Motion was made by both defen-
dants pursuant to Rule 37 (b) (2) (iii) and Rule 41 
(b) to dismiss plaintiffs Complaint for failure to an-
swer the Interrogatories. 
The trial Court granted defendants' Motions 
and entered a dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint. It 
is without dispute that the trial Court did not specify 
that the dismissal was without prejudice. The Order 
signed and entered by the Court was as follows: 
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plain-
tiff Raymond Stewart's Oompaint as against 
both de:f endant John L. Sulivan and Richard 
Monk Allen be and it is hereby dismissed." R. 
51. 
Rule 37 (b) (2) (iii) provides that for failure 
of a party to answer designated questions, the Court 
may make such Orders which include the following: 
"· ''' (iii) an Order . . . dismissing the ac-
tion ... " 
7 
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Rule 41 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute 
or to comply with these rules or any order of 
the Court, a defendant may move for a dismis-
sal of an action or of any claim against him ... 
Unless the Court in its order for dismissal oth-
erwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdi-
vision and any dismissal nat provided for in 
this rule ... operates as an adjudication upon 
the merits." 
Whether or not the trial Court Judge in his mind 
wanted to specify the dismissal to be without preju-
dice is of little significance at this point. At no time 
was this desire, alleged by plaintiff, expressed either 
orally in Court, in the minutes or in the written Or-
der. 
In the case of B"lankenship v. Royalty Holding 
Co., (10th Cir. 1953) 202 F.2d 77 where a Motion to 
Dismiss (for failure to state a claim) was granted 
by the trial Court, the Circuit Court held: 
"Courts possess the inherent power to cor-
rect errors in the records evidencing the judg-
ment pronounced by the Court so as to make 
them speak the truth by actually reflecting 
that which was in fact done. They do not, how-
ever, possess the po'Yer to .correct a~ eri;-or by 
the Court in rendermg a Judgment it did not 
intend to render and by such an Order change 
a 'judgment actually but erroneously pronounc-
ed by the Court to one the Court in tended to re-
cord." 
The allegation of plaintiff (as to the trial 
8 
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?o~rt's intention to render a dismissal without pre-
JUd1ce) appears to be without substance as evidenced 
by the fact that upon notice and Motion of the defen-
dants, the trial Court immediately reinstated it for-
mer Order of Dismissal with prejudice. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
DO NOT ALLOW OR PROVIDE FOR A MOTION 
FOR FURTHER HEARING BEFORE RULING 
OF THE COURT. 
After plaintiff's counsel contacted counsel for 
John L. Sullivan and discovered, as alleged by plain-
tiff that the dismissal was with prejudice the follow-
ing events took place. 
1. Counsel for plaintiff approached the trial 
Court ex parte, without notice to either defendant 
and presented to the Court and the Court signed an 
"Amended Order of Dismissal which contained the 
following language: 
"A clerical error having been made in the 
drafting of the Order df Dismissal herein in 
that said Order omitted the words '''without 
prejudice" as directed by the 9ourt, and said 
error having come to the attention of the Court, 
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 
60 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Proced~re, the 
Court 'on its own initiative corrects said error 
by amending the Order of Dismissal to read 
as follows: 
It is hereby ordered that plaintiff, Ray-
9 
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mond Stewart's Compl.aint as against both de-
fendants, John L. Sulhvan and Richard Monk 
Allen, be and it is hereby dismissed without 
prejudice." R. 55. 
2. Upon learning of this Order, counsel for both 
defendants immediately upon notice and motion re-
quested the Court to reinstate its former Order of 
Dismissal. 
Plaintiff then moved the Court to amend the Or-
der of Dismissal on additional grounds pursuant to 
Rule 61 (b) (7). R. 65. The Court granted defen-
dants' Motion and denied plaintiff's Motion, thereby 
reinstating the original order of dismissal with pre- 1 
judice. 
3. Plaintiff then filed its Motion for further 
hearing before the Court. The only new allegations 
of substance made in writing were that the previous 
attorney for the plaintiff had been suspended from 
the practice of law in the State of Utah on May 14, 
1971, a month and 12 days after the Order of Dismis-
sal had originally been entered. 
The trial Court granted plaintiff's Motion to 
amend the Order of Dismissal to a dismissal without ' 
prejudice. 
Concerning a "Motion to Reconsider" this Court 
stated: 
''We are unaware of any such a Motion 
under our rules . . . 
We think the Motion to Reconsider the 
10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Motion to vacate the pudgment is abortive un-
der .the rule~ .... " Utah State Employees Credit 
Union v. Riding, 24 U. 2d 211, 469 P.2d 1. 
Obviously to allow a party to have two or more 
chances at the same Motion without a showing of ex-
traordinary circumstances is not appropriate under 
the Rules. 
The result of all the fore going is that the trial 
Court has changed the original dismissal three times 
to read as follows: 1. without prejudice, 2. with pre-
judice, 3. without prejudice. 
POINT III 
A PARTY MOVING FOR RELIEF FROM A 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE PROVI-
SIONS OF RULE 60 (b) OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE MUST STATE WITH 
PARTICULARITY THE GR 0 UN D S AND 
FACTS UPON WHICH THE MOTION IS BASED. 
Plaintiff's Motions do not specify the grounds 
upon which the Motions are based. The first Motion 
contains the following language: 
"The Court in the above entitled case hav-
ing acted upon its own initiative under Rule 60 
(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to C?rr~ct 
a clerical error to amend the Order of D1sm1s-
sal herein showing the same to be without pre-
judice plaintiff acknowledges the correctness 
of the'Court's ruling and moves.t~at the same 
relief also be granted on the additional ground 
as set forth in Rule 60 (b) (7)_, Ut~h Rul~s of 
Civil Procedure which Rule likewise entitles 
plaintiff to the ~elief sought. 
11 
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This motion is based upon the files and re-
cor~s herein together with the Affidavit of 
Neil D. Schaerrer, showing that plaintiff is 
clearly entitled to said relief." R. 65, 66. 
The Affidavit states geenrally that in Septem-
ber, 1971 (at least five months after the Order of Dis-
missal) that plaintiff contacted new counsel and said: 
plaintiff could not get his attorney Lambert Gibson 
to explain to him the status of the case. Neil D. 
Schaerrer, plaintiff's second attorney, obtained the 
file and apparently relied upon the statement of Mr. 
Winder (attorney for defendant Richard Monk Al-
len) that the case had been dismissed without pre-
judice. In reliance upon this statement, Neil D. 
Schaerrer took no further steps to amend the judg-
ment until he contacted Jack L. Schoenhals (attorney 
f01· defendant John L. Sullivan) and was informed 
the dismissal was with prejudice. 
The entire Affidavit appears to be one reciting 
some facts and some conclusions which all relate to 
the "mistake, inadvertance, or neglect" of the coun-
sel for the plaintiff. 
The second Motion filed by plaintiff (R. 88) ap-
pears to be similar in nature to the first but appar-
ently includes an additional theory, to wit: that plain-
tiff himself was unaware of the Order of Dismissal 
and the Order of Suspension of his attorney from the 
practice of law until the latter part of September, 
1971. 
The Affidavit of Lambert Gibson, R 85 (plain-
12 
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tiff's first attorney) sates generally that he relied 
upon the statement of Mr. Winder that the dismissal 
was without prejudice. 
In the case of United States v. $3,216.59 in Unit-
ed States Currency, 41 F.R.D. 435 the Court stated: 
. " ... liberality cannot extend to granting 
rehef, where there is no evidentiary showing 
or a '·'reason" under the rule and a meritorious 
de'f ense ... "such an application for extraor-
dinary relier must be fully substantiated by 
adequate proof and its exceptional character 
must be clearly established * * * ." 
The Court said the mistake of counsel must be 
set forth clearly showing the nature of the mistake 
with particularity. Having failed to do so the Motion 
is denied. 
In Ledwith v. Storkan (D.C. Neb. 1942) 2. F.-
R.D. 539, the Court held the grounds of excusable 
neglect must be set forth with particularity. 
In Frank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 27 
F.R.D. 258 ( 1961) the Court stated: 
'~The leading case of Ledwith v. Storkan, 
supra, enunciates the basi~ proposition t~~t 
the moving party must articulate the specific 
reasons which constitute excusable neglect. 
The defendant has only offered a genei;al c~n­
clusion, it has not offered any ext~nuatmg c1:;-
cumstances or reasons surroundmg counsel s 
failure to :follow instructions." 
This Court has stated the same principles, where-
in this Court said : 
13 
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."We are not told the nature of the illness 
an~ it doe~ not appear that appellant ... was 
so mcapac1taeted that he could not have called 
an atorney to have his rights and the rights o'f 
the corporation protected." Warren v. Dixon 
Ranch Co., 123 U. 416, 260 P.2d 741. 
It is obvious from reading the Motions and Af-
fidavits filed by plaintiff that in no way does plain-
tiff explain or set forth the reasons why he did not 
discover until the later part of September, 1971, that 
'the Order of Dismissal had been entered or that his 
attorney had not answered the Interrogatories serv-
ed upon him in September of 1970, or that his attor-
ney had been suspended from the practice of law in 
May of 1971. The Affidavits and Motions of Plaintiff 
are void of any details whatsoever concerning these 
very important points. They set forth no details ex-
plaining plaintiff's attorneys' mistaken reliance up-
on the belief that the dismissal was without prejudice 1 
and their failure over the several months to read the 
Order of Dismissal and determine its effect. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT AUTHOR-
ITY TO AMEND THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
UPON PLAINTIFF'S M 0 TI 0 N AND THE 
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AMENDING SAID ORDER. 
A. THE TIME LIMITATION OF THRENEG 
MONTHS BARRED THE GRANTI 
OF THE MOTION. 
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
14 
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ure provides: 
"On motion ... the Court may in the fur-
therance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
represent~tive from a final judgment ... for 
the f ollowmg reasons: ( 1) mistake in advert-. ' ance, surprise, or excusable neglect . . . ( 7) 
any ?ther reaso? justifying relief 'from the op-
eration of the Judgment. The Motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
( 1) , ( 2) , ( 3) or ( 4), not more than three 
months after the judgment, Order or proceed-
ing was entered or taken." (In substance this 
is the same as Rule 60 (b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure except the time limitation 
in the Federal Rule is one year instead of three 
months.) 
Plaintiff filed its Motions to amend the Order 
of Dismissal on April 7, 1972 (R. 65) and on April 
24, 1972 (R. 88). Both Motions were filed more than 
one year after the entry of the original Order of Dis-
missal (April 2, 1971). (R. 51). 
Neither of the two Motions were filed within the 
three month time limitation nor were they filed with-
in a reasonable time. 
In Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 U 2d 222, 341 P.2d 949, 
this Court stated: 
~~Pilchers attacked the whole proceedings 
as being viola:tive of Rule 60 (b), Utah R:ul~s 
of Civil Procedure, with its three m.o~th limi-
tations feature relating to ~ntertammg ~o­
tions for relief because of mistake, newly dis-
covered evidence and the like. A r~ading of t.he 
rule makes it apparent that a Motion for rehef 
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based on the grounds enumerated· therein is ' 
ineffective if made three months after the de-
cision from which relief is sought. 
* * * * . 
The attack here being based on fraud up-
on the Court, and having been leveled some 17 
months after the adoption decree, must have 
been pursued in an independent action, and not , 
by way of Motion in the original action other-
wise, the rule would not make much sense." 
This Court clearly established that Motions bas-
ed upon the reasons (1-6) in Rule 60 (b) must be 
made within the three month limitation period. 
That Motions based upon the reasons s~t forth 
in Rule 60 (b) (1-6) must be made within the time 
limitations specified is a rule clearly established by 
the Courts. Wallace v. United States (2nd Cir) 142 
F~2d 240, Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., (2nd Cir. 
1967) 385 F 2d 818, United States v. Karahalia.s 
(2nd Cir. 1953) 205 F 2d 331, Klapprott v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 601, 69, S.Ct. 384, 93 L Ed. 266, 
Carrethers v. St. Louis - San Francisco Railway Co., 
(D.C. Okl. 1967) 264 F. Supp. 171. 
B. THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 60 (b) 
(1-6) and (7) ARE MUTUALLY EX-
CLUSIVE AND THE LATTER CAN-
NOT BE USED TO A VOID THE TIME 
LIMITATION OF THE FORMER PRO-
VISIONS (1-6). 
In Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., (2nd Cir. 
1967) 387 F 2d 818, the Court stated: 
" ... Rule 60 (b) (6) (same as Utah Rule 
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60 ( b). ( 7) ) is n?t a carte Manche to cast adrift 
from fixed moormgs an~ time l!mitations guid-
ed o!11Y by t~e necessarily variant consciences 
of different Judges ... and may be relied upon 
only in "exceptional circumstances." 
Thus it is settled that Rule 60 (b) (1) 
and 60 ( b) ( 6) are not pari passu and are mu-
tually exclusive, and that the latter section can-
not ~e l}Sed to break out from the rigid time 
restrictmn of the former ... we are convinced 
that Rinieri has failed to bring himself within 
the "extremely meagre" scope as Judge L. 
Hand referred to it of Rule 60 (b) (6)." 
In United States v. Karahalias, (2nd Cir. 1953) 
205 F 2d 331, the Court stated: 
Nin this Petition for a rehearing the Unit-
ed States raises two points, the first of which 
is that we were wrong when we said that as to 
Karahalias ''there is no doubt that his ground 
for relief is 'excusable neglect;' " and also when 
we said subsection ( 6) of the Rule 60 (b) 
should be read '''as giving the Court a discre-
tionary dispensing power over the limitation 
imposed by the Rule itself on subsections ( 1), 
(2) and (3)." Both these statements, the Peti-
tion says, were contrary to the opinion of the 
Supreme Court in Klapprott v. United States, 
335 U.S. 601, 69 S. Ct. 384, 93 L Ed. 266, and 
we agree ... we must also retract the construc-
tion put upon subsection ( 6), and hold that no 
"neglect" however excusable, will survive the 
limitation of Rule 60 (b) ." 
As has been previously cited in this Brief (Shaw 
v. Pilcher, supra) this Court has ruled that a motion 
based upon Rule 60 (b) (3) must be brought within 
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three months, "otherwise, the rule would not make 
much sense." 
Although plaintiff would like to characterize its 
Motions as being grounded upon facts which bring it 
within the provisions of Rule 60 (b) (7), it is obvious 
that the basis of the Motions is '''neglect, mistake or 
inadvertance," clearly all within the bounds and three 
rnon th limi ta ti on of Rule 60 ( b) ( 1) and therefore 
excluded from the provisions of paragrph ( 7). 
It was clearly beyond the authority of the Court 1 
and it constituted an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to amend the Order of Dismissal based upon 
plaintiff's Motions and Affidavits. 
C. THE "NEGLECT" SPECIFIED IN RULE 60 
(b) ( 1) MUST BE EXCUSABLE AND IS SUB-
JECT TO THE THREE MONTH LIMITA-
TION PERIOD. INEXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
IS NOT GROUNDS FOR RELIEF UNDER 
RULE 60 (b) (7). 
1. The Motions and Affidavits of plaintiff 
must of necessity refer to two or more acts o! neglect. 
The first act of neglect by plaintiff's counsel was its 
failure to answer the Interrogatories. Concerning 
this neglect, the plaintiff's Affidavits merely state 
that plaintiff's attorney was busy and apparently 
just did not get around to answering the Interroga-
tories. The Affidavits do not disclose any ''excusable" 
neglect. This Court stated in Warren v. Dixon Ranch 
Co., 123 U 416, 260 P 2d 741: 
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:'we are not told the nature of the illness 
a~d it does no~ appear that appellant Arnold 
Dixon was so mcapacitated that he could not 
have .called an attorney to have his rights and 
the rights of the corporation protected .... 
And although a judgment may be eITOn-
eous and inequitable, equitable relief will not 
be granted to a party thereto on the sole ground 
that the negiigenc~ of the attorney, agent, trus-
tee or representative of the present complain-
ant prevented a fair trial." 
This Court refused to reverse the trial Court's 
ruling which denied a Motion to set aside a def a ult 
judgment where the plaintiff's attorney knew of the. 
trial setting but did not appear. Chrysler v. Chrysler, 
5 U 2d 415, 303 P 2d 995. See also Masters v. Le-
Seuer, 13 U 2d 293, 373 P 2d 573. 
In Frank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 27 
F.R.D. 258 (1961) where the attorney failed to file 
a Mot'ion for a new trial or an appeal the Court said: 
"Defendant centends that its counsel's 
omission constitutes excusable neglect within 
the term of ... 60 (b) ( 1). The Court finds 
that the defendant's view is untenable. An 
'omission or any carelessness on the part of 
counsel does not automatically constitute '"ex-
cusable neglect" as the term is employed in 
Fed. R Civ. P. 60 (b) (1). 
* * * * 
The leading case or L_edwith v .. $torkan, 
supra, enunciates the bas1~ proposition *~t 
the moving party must articulate the specific 
reasons which constitute excusable neglect. 
The defendant has only offered a general con-
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clusion; it has riot offered any extenuating cir-
cu!llstances or reasons surrounding counsel's 
failure to follow instructions. This Court 
therefore concludes that this omission without 
a further showing of extenuation doe~ not con-
stitute "excusable neglect" withi~ the purview 
of Fed. R Cir. P. 60 (b) (1) ." 
See also Dalrymple v. Pittsburgh Consolidation 
Coal Company, (D.C. Penn. 1959) 24 F.R.D. 260, 
where the Court said you must show neglect is ex-
cusable. See also Ohliger v. United States (2nd Cir. 
1962) 308 F 2d 667, where the Court found no ex-
cusable neglect and stated that mere ignorance of 
Court's rules of procedures does not constitute excus-
able neglect. For other cases with similar rulings see 
the following: Hoffman v. Celebreeze (8th Cir. 1969) 
405 F 2d 833; In Re Wright (D.C. Mo. 1965) 247 F 
Supp. 648; and Federal Enterprises v. Frank Allbrit-
ten Motors, (D.C. Mo. 1954) 16 F.R.D. 109. 
2. The second act of neglect specified by plain-
tiff was the failure of its first and second attorney 
to understand the nature of the dismissal - that it 
was with prejudice; and there is an inference that 
the two atorneys somehow relied on the statement of 
Mr. Winder that ''he thought" the case was dismissed 
without prejudice. 
Concerning this concept of ''neglect," where a 
moving appellant employed an attorney who called 
plaintiff's atorney and was told "he would be allowed 
a longer time in which to file his Answer." This Court 
said: 
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. "Sucfi a promise, if given, could in no way 
bmd a chent .who already had a judgment." 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. 123 U 416 260 
p 2d 741. ' ' 
It must be observed that this "reliance' 'theory of 
plaintiff is founded upon conversations with Mr. 
Winder which occurred sometime after the entry of 
the judgment of dismissal with prejudice. 
In Geigel v. Sea Land Service, Inc. (D.C. Puerto 
Rico 1968) 44 F.R.D. 1, the plaintiff's Complaint had 
been dismissed for failure to answer Interrogatories. 
The Court stated: 
'~The useful purpose of the principle of 
finality of judments requires that the Court 
scrutinize the Motion for relief and the grounds 
upon which it is based. II judgments are vacat~ 
ed on tenuous and insignificant grounds they 
will lack finality and there will be no end to 
litigation. 
Petitioner voluntarily chose the attorney 
as his representative in the action, and he can-
not now avoid the consequences of the acts or 
omissions of this freely selected agent. Any 
other notion would be wholly inconsistent with 
our system of representative litigation, in 
wnich each party is deemed b<;>und b)'. the acts 
of his lawyer - agent and is considered to 
have notice of all facts, notice of which can be 
charged upon the attorney." 
In Ledwith v. Storkan, (D.C. Neb. 1942) 2F.-
R.D. 539 the Court said: 
'''Carelessness and negligence is not akin to 
excusable neglect ... 
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. Negligence of counsel is imputed to his 
chent." 
In Ohlinger v. United States, (2nd Cir. 1962) 
308 F 2d 667 the Court held that ignorance of Court's 
rules of procedure is not excusable neglect. 
In Carrethers v. St. Louis - San Francisco Rail-
way Co., (D.C. Okl.1967) 264 F. Supp.171, the 
Court held that inexcusable neglect was not available 
as grounds for relief under Rule 60 (b) (6) (same 
as our ( 7) ) and should not be given special treat-
ment. The Court made the following observation: 
"I'f ''''excusable neglect" cannot be raised 1 
P,Xcept within a year (3 months under our 
rules) then certainly inexcusable neglect 
should not be given more favorable treatment 
and thus cannot be said to be "any other rea-
son justifying :relief" under Rule 60 (b) (6). ' 
In other words, inexcusable neglect which 
here also amounts to contributory fault by the 
plaintiff will not provide the necessary extra-
ordinary circumstances to warrant the extra-
ordinary relief afforded by Rule 60 (b) (6)." 
Why the plaintiff himself did nothing about his 1 
legal action for almost one year is not explained in 
the Affidavits but we can only assume was the result 
of inexcusable neglect upon his part, amounting to 
contributory negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff and his attorney for some unex-
plained reason, failed to answer the Interrogatories 
served upon them on September 29, 1970 (even after 
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Order of the trial Court), allowed a dismissal to be 
entered and failed to read the Order to determine its 
effect. One year after the Interrogatories had hen 
served the plaintiff retained a new attorney who, 
with his attorney, waited until a year after the dis--
missal had been entered before any attempt was made 
to attack the Order. On the part of both the plaintiff 
and his attorneys it is obvious they were extremely 
neglectful. Having failed to show their neglect was 
excusable and having filed their motions more than 
three months after the entry of dismissal had been 
entered, they were not entitled to attack the Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice. The trial Court was with-
out authori'ty to change the original Order and abus-
ed its discretion in disturbing the year old Order. This 
Court should correct the error of the trial Court and 
reinstate the original Order of Dismissal with Pre-
judice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK L. SCHOENHALS 
721 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
John L. Sullivan 
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